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Elite vs. amateur
West Point and the Commons
The study of Civil War generalship has gotten a bit stale. Many historians
and buffs keep asking the same familiar questions: Did the South have better
military leaders? Why did it take so long for the Union to find competent
commanders? And of course, could Robert E. Lee have won the battle of
Gettysburg? These sorts of queries fail to deepen our broader understanding of
the war, its causes or its consequences. Instead, such trite questions (and their
equally misleading answers) tend to reduce the conflict to a predictable story of
famous battles and famous leaders.
Thomas J. Goss's new book, The War within the Union High Command
wants to recast the whole debate about Civil War generalship. The author, an
army major working as a strategic planner for Homeland Defense, understands
especially well that war, and the American military as a whole, cannot be studied
in a vacuum. He recognizes that the United States has a rich, complex and
contradictory martial heritage that has dramatically affected its history.
Nineteenth-century Americans tended to celebrate what they perceived to be the
natural patriotism and talents of the amateur general over that of the elitist West
Point-trained officer. Yet, today, few Americans would support appointing men
or women to high levels of command without a proven military record. Goss
aptly demonstrates how the Civil War helped change Americans' attitudes about
military professionals.
Goss chooses to focus solely on the Union war effort, arguing that Jefferson
Davis, who himself had a West Point education, did not face the same challenges
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Lincoln did in achieving the north's complicated war aims. Goss contends that
for the North it was not merely a question of winning on the battlefield; instead,
Lincoln had to be aware constantly of the political effects of his military
decisions and visa versa. He had to keep the northern public supportive of the
war or the entire effort would fail. In the meantime, West Pointers clashed with
political generals, each convinced that the other hurt the Union cause. At stake
were two different perceptions of war: one narrowly focused on battlefield
victories; the other concerned with winning the hearts and minds of the northern
public.
The most impressive part of Goss's study is his discussion of the
stereotypical political general. He demonstrates that some of the best known (and
most maligned) amateurs like Benjamin Butler, Franz Sigel and Nathaniel Banks
actually made important contributions to the North's overall victory over the
Confederacy. These political generals certainly committed their share of
embarrassing battlefield mistakes and few, except perhaps John Logan,
displayed any real military genius. But, Goss notes, these men made significant
political contributions that cannot be dismissed. They helped attract volunteers
and garnered congressional and state support Lincoln had to have to win the war.
Goss also notes that many professionals like George B. McClellan and Ambrose
Burnside were no less disastrous on the battlefield than the likes of Butler or
Banks.
By the fall of 1864, however, the struggle between professionals and
amateurs had played itself out, and West Pointers were in control. It was not that
politics no longer mattered. But times had changed from the first two years of
war, and Lincoln had won reelection and weathered attacks on some of his most
controversial policies including the Emancipation Proclamation and
conscription. And he had found a general who understood the importance of
politics as well as the necessity of battlefield results: U.S. Grant.
This book does have some weaknesses. The author's decision to leave the
Confederacy out implies that the Union's struggle was only within itself, and not
with a formidable, inspired foe. Nor is it convincing to argue that Davis did not
face similar political challenges. Davis also had to worry about public morale
and unpopular wartime policies. The South too had its share of political generals
including John Floyd and Gideon Pillow. Finally, the book is often repetitious,
and the writing could be more spirited. Civil War buffs who love a good war
story will be disappointed.
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Nonetheless, Goss has written a valuable book. Civil War history needs
more studies such as this one to refresh the field, recast old questions and get us
beyond simplistic assumptions about Civil War military history.
Lesley J. Gordon is associate professor of history at the University of Akron.
Her publications include General George E. Pickett in Life and Legend (UNC
Press, 1998) and This Terrible War: The Civil War and its Aftermath (Longman,
2003).
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